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I.

INTRODUCTION

Quanta Resources processed waste oil at two facilities, one
located in Long Island, New York and the other in Edgewater, New
Jersey.' In June of 1981 the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) found that Quanta had violated its permit by
accepting oil contaminated with dangerous substances known as
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) at the Edgewater site.2 Shortly
after the two parties began negotiations regarding cleanup of the
Edgewater site, NJDEP ordered Quanta to cease operations at the
New Jersey facility. 3
Before the negotiations were completed, however, Quanta filed
for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.4 Immediately thereafter, NJDEP ordered Quanta to cleanup
the Edgewater site.5 The following month, still unable to overcome
its financial difficulties, Quanta converted the bankruptcy action into
a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Code.6
1. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755
(1986). The facility at Edgewater was operated pursuant to a temporary permit issued by the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (N.J.D.E.P.). In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F.2d 927, 928 (3d Cir. 1983), aff'dsub nom. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
2. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 928.
3. Id.
4. In re Quanta Resources Corp., No. 81-05967 (D.N.J. 1983) (order authorizing
abandonment).
5. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 928.
6. Although the Court did not indicate what events had contributed to Quanta's financial
ruin, it is possible that the costs of compliance with federal and state hazardous waste disposal
1299
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Subsequently, a New York investigation revealed that Quanta
had accepted oil contaminated with dangerous chemicals at the Long
Island site as well.7 The trustee in bankruptcy determined that proper
disposal of the waste oil would render the property a waste to the
estate and sought to sell the property at the Long Island site for the
benefit of Quanta's creditors.' Unable to sell the property, the trustee
notified the creditors and the bankruptcy court that he intended to
abandon the property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554(a). 9 The City and
State of New York objected, claiming that abandonment would
threaten the public health and safety and violate both federal and
state environmental laws.' 0 Despite these objections, the bankruptcy
court approved the petition for abandonment."I The United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the decision of
the bankruptcy court.' 2 Consequently, New York appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.' 3
regulations may have contributed to the corporation's downfall. Id. at 929. One author has
noted that comprehensive federal regulation of the hazardous waste disposal industry has
resulted in huge increases in the cost of hazardous waste disposal, driving some companies into
bankruptcy. Note, Belly Up Down in the Dumps: Bankruptcy and Hazardous Waste Cleanup,
38 VAND. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1985); see also Rosenbaum, Bankruptcy and Environmental
Regulation: An Emerging Conflict, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,099 (April 1983).
7. MidatlanticNatl Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 758. The investigation revealed that Quanta had
accepted 70,000 gallons of PCB-contaminated oil stored in deteriorating and leaking
containers at the site. Id.
8. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 55 Bankr. 696 (D.N.J. 1983).
9. Id. The text of 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) provides: "After notice and a hearing the trustee
may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (Supp. 1982).
10. MidatlanticNat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 758. Abandonment would have revested title in

Quanta; therefore no solvent party would have been responsible for the cleanup. In re Quanta
Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v.
New Jersey Dep't. Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986). Furthermore, abandonment
would have resulted in a continuing violation of state and local hazardous waste storage laws.
In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 914.
11. In re Quanta Resources Corp., No. 81-05967 (D.N.J. 1983) (order authorizing
abandonment).
12. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 55 Bankr. 696 (D.N.J. 1983). The court relied on a
passage from the bankruptcy court's decision:
The City and State are in a better position in every respect than either the trustee
or the debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done to protect the public against
the dangers posed by the PCB-contaminated facility. But it is not the estate or
the debtor's creditors who should finance the requisite cleanup, given the
decision of the trustee to abandon the property.
Id. at 698 (citing Transcript of June 22, 1982 Proceedings at 6, In re Quanta Resources Corp.,
No. 81-05967 (D.N.J. 1983)). One can infer that the bankruptcy court considered the interests
of creditors and recognized the unfairness of imposing cleanup costs on innocent creditors.
For a discussion of creditor's rights, see infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
13. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1983), aff'd sub noam.
Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
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While New York's appeal was pending, the trustee filed notice of
his intention to abandon the contaminated waste oil at the Edgewater
site.' 4 Once again, the bankruptcy court approved the petition for
abandonment.' 5 Furthermore, the bankruptcy court did not require
the trustee to take any precautions to reduce the danger that the toxic
wastes at the two sites had created.' 6 Concerned with the health
threat that the presence of PCB's created, New York decontaminated
the Long Island facility at a cost of 2.5 million dollars.' 7
As the New York and New Jersey cases presented identical
issues, the parties in the New Jersey litigation consented to allow
NJDEP to take a direct appeal from the bankruptcy court to the
Third Circuit pursuant to section 405(c)(1)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978.1' The Third Circuit reversed the orders, prohibiting the
trustee from abandoning the property in both cases.' 9 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases. 2° Affirming the
decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held: Because a
trustee in bankruptcy's abandonment power is subject to exceptions of
a police nature, the states could require the trustee to cleanup the
14. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom.
Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
15. In re Quanta Resources Corp., No. 81-05967 (D.N.J. 1983).
16. Id. In Midatlantic Nat'l Bank, the Supreme Court noted that the bankruptcy court
did not require the trustee to take even relatively minor steps to reduce the health dangers that
Quanta's facility created. Moreover, abandonment would have halted security measures at
both sites, aggravating the already existing danger from chemical wastes. Midatlantic Nat'l
Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 758 n.3.
17. New York's concern is not surprising. PCB's pose a serious health threat to the public
and, as the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted in Quanta, are highly toxic. In re
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 913 n.1. The chemical collects readily in human fat,
remaining in the human system for years. See M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE 246-47(1986).
PCB's cause severe skin rashes and are linked to birth defects in babies. See id. (discussing
Japanese study of pregnant women exposed to PCB's).
Moreover, the 2.5 million dollars that the State of New York spent in the cleanup of the
Long Island facility represents a minute fraction of the funds required to cleanup all the
hazardous waste dumpsites that currently pose potential threats to the public health. One
estimate of the costs needed for cleanup is somewhere between 26.2 and 44.1 billion dollars.
See Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. on
Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt.4, at 38 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
18. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927, 928 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom.
Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
19. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1985) aff'd sub nom.
Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986); In re
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir 1985), aff'd sub nom. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986). The court rested both
decisions on its conclusion that section 554(a) had codified the judge-made abandonment rule
which allowed equitable principles of state law to limit the trustee's power to abandon.
20. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755
(1986).
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hazardous wastes at the two sites before abandoning the property.
MidatlanticNational Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
This note examines the conflict between the policies that underly
the abandonment power under the Bankruptcy Code and the policies
embodied in environmental protection statutes. The note will then
examine the Supreme Court's analysis in the Midatlantic National
Bank decision and its attempt to reconcile the conflicts between a
trustee in bankruptcy's abandonment power and environmental protection concerns. Finally, this note suggests a test for future courts
that attempts to reconcile the trustee's power to abandon estate assets
and the public health concerns unique to toxic wastes. This test
weighs creditors' desire to be free from unduly burdensome duties
against the ever urgent need to protect the public's health and welfare.

II.

THE CONFLICT IN

Midatlantic National Bank

Midatlantic National Bank is representative of the conflict
between the policies implicit in the Bankruptcy Code and those in the
environmental protection laws.2 1 Congress drafted the abandonment
provision of the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate the efficient distribution of assets to creditors in a liquidation proceeding. 22 Environmental protection laws, on the other hand, function to protect the public
health regardless of cost. Thus, the trustee's attempt to abandon toxic
waste sites in Midatlantic National Bank forced the Court to reconcile the competing policies underlying the abandonment provision in
the Bankruptcy Code and environmental protection statutes.2 3
In recent years, toxic waste disposal has become a topic of
increasing public concern.2 4 In 1978, the Love Canal incident
21. Courts have addressed this conflict in the context of a petition for bankruptcy, a debt
dischargeable in bankruptcy, and the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. See In
re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454 (1982) (state's attempt to ascertain financial status of debtor subject to
automatic stay provision), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 810 (1983) (state judgment
directing cleanup of toxic waste site constituted a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy); In re
Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 Bankr. 918 (D. Mass. 1983) (dismissing petition
in bankruptcy because debtor's contaminated landfill posed immediate danger to the public
drinking supply).
22. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
23. See Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 584

(1981) (stating that federal legislation, state laws and recent litigation all reflect concern over
the improper disposal of hazardous wastes); see also M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE (1980)

(discussing hazardous waste problems in the Love Canal region and in other areas of the
United States). See generally Hearings, supra note 17 (discussing the magnitude of the
hazardous waste disposal problem).
24. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d sess. 8-10 (1980).
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brought the toxic waste problem into the national spotlight." Residents of Love Canal, New York, became victims of chemical wastes
that seeped into their basements from a neighboring landfill.2 6 The
incidence of cancer in the Love Canal population rose significantly,2 7
and as a result, the government relocated the residents at its own
expense.2 8 Today, eight years after the Love Canal episode was first
reported, the toxic wastes that originally caused the government to
evacuate and relocate the Love Canal residents are still threatening
the public health.2 9 Thus, Love Canal remains continuing testimony
to the gravity of the toxic waste problem.
Love Canal, however, is just one example of toxic waste threat to
public health.3 ° Not surprisingly, the federal government has
responded by enacting various regulatory legislation to confront the
toxic waste problem. The two major statutes are the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,31 and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act.32 In addition, numerous
states have enacted statutory provisions to control the use and dispoa3
sal of dangerous chemicals such as PCB's.
While environmental statutes protect the public health, the abandonment provision of the Bankruptcy Code protects creditors. The
abandonment power permits a trustee in bankruptcy to abandon
25. Id. at 9.
26. Among these were birth defects, miscarriages, epilepsy, liver abnormalities, sores,
rectal bleeding, and headaches. Id. at 9.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Although moved to a new containment site, the toxic wastes have continued to migrate
and are now threatening a nearby residential neighborhood. See E.P.A. Draft Report Says Love
Canal Wastes Dumped in Leaking Landfill DisposalFacility, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
1149-50 (Nov. 1984).
29. See generally M. BROWN, supra note 17.
30. See generally M. BROWN, supra note 17 (discussing hazardous waste in the United
States); EPSTEIN, BROWN & POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 81-87 (noting waste
disposal trouble spots in California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York and New Jersey).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6987 (1982). The RCRA regulates the treatment, storage, and
disposal of hazardous waste. As one author has noted, the statute established a "cradle-tograve" system designed to monitor hazardous wastes from creation to permanent disposal. See
Note, supra note 6, at 1037.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982). This statute established the "Superfund," a pool from
which state and federal agencies can draw to defray the cost of toxic waste cleanup. The
statute also provides for recovery of costs from the parties responsible for the hazardous
wastes. Id.
33. See ALA. CODE § 22-30-13 (1984); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25159.10-25244
(West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-220 (1985); FLA. STAT. §§ 403.721-.74 (1985);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 252-4 to -20 (1977 & Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 224.005-.866 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 299.501-.551 (1984); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW §§ 27.0900-.0923 (McKinney 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.01-.99 (Page 1980
& Supp. 1985).
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property that is either worthless or burdensome to the bankruptcy
estate.34 This power permits the trustee to avoid spending the estate's
assets on the administration of worthless property. 35 Thus, the power
protects creditors by allowing the trustee to reduce "the debtor's
property to money as expeditiously as practicable so as to secure
36
funds for distribution.
Given the gravity of the toxic waste threat, however, one might
question whether courts should ever consider creditors' interests
when environmental statutes and the abandonment provision conflict.
While no one can dispute the importance of public health concerns, a
failure to even address creditors' interests will ultimately affect industries manufacturing a variety of goods essential to our society. Hazardous waste is a by-product of chemical, primary metal, textile,
plastic and petroleum production,37 and the blind subordination of
creditor's interests to environmental legislation will force banks and
other lenders to reevaluate the risk of lending to manufacturers of
these products.3" Some lenders, fearful of becoming the insurers of
toxic waste cleanup, will find the risk too high.3 9 Others will simply
increase the cost of credit.4 0 A number of manufacturers will face
bankruptcy as credit becomes less available. Moreover, all manufacturers will pass the increasing cost of credit on to consumers. 4'
The conflict in Midatlantic National Bank, therefore, concerns
more than just public health and the orderly administration of bankruptcy estates. The abandonment provision is designed to protect
34. Although codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 554(a), the abandonment power was originally a
judicially developed doctrine. See American File Co. v. Garret, 110 U.S. 288 (1884)
(recognizing that assignees are not bound to accept property of onerous or unprofitable
character); Federal Land Bank v. Nadler, 116 F.2d 1004, 1007 (10th Cir.) (a trustee may
abandon property that is encumbered with liens in excess of its value), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
578 (1941); Life Ins. Co. v. Koplar Co., 80 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1936) (holding that the
bankruptcy court has the power to enter an order permitting a trustee to abandon encumbered
property); see also 4 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 70.42 (1978) (discussing the
evolution of the abandonment power).
35. 4 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 554.01 (1985).
36. Id. Efficient reduction of the debtor's estate is the paramount goal of a bankruptcy
liquidation. See also Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930) (noting that the
bankruptcy laws are intended to bring about an equitable distribution of the debtor's estate).
37. Hazardous Waste Fact Sheet, 5 EPA JOURNAL 12 (1979).
38. For a discussion of the effects of subordinating the interests of creditors to public
health and safety concerns expressed in the environmental statutes, see infra note 99 and
accompanying text.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.

1986]

MIDA TLANTIC NATIONAL BANK

1305

creditors' interest.4 2 Ignoring these interests could have long term
negative effects on society.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit
holding that the trustee in bankruptcy could not abandon the toxic
waste sites in contravention of the environmental protection statutes.4 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell analyzed a series of
prestatute cases limiting the trustee's power to abandon and determined that Congress had intended to codify these limitations when it
drafted the abandonment provision.' Accordingly, the majority concluded that the trustee's power to abandon was subject to certain
police power exceptions.45
The majority heavily relied on a line of prestatute cases beginning with Ottenheimer v. Whitaker.4 6 In Ottenheimer,the Fourth Circuit denied a trustee in bankruptcy permission to abandon several
delapidated barges anchored in Baltimore harbor.47 Abandonment
would have resulted in violation of a federal statute making it unlawful to obstruct the passage of vessels through a navigable channel.48
The Ottenheimer court noted that courts should not construe a judicial rule that was "not provided for by statute and rather built up by
the courts for facilitating the administration and distribution of a
bankrupt estate," to reach so unjust result as permitting the obstruction of a navigable channel in contravention of a federal statute.4 9
The Midatlantic Court also approved the decision in In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co.," a Seventh Circuit case that followed
Ottenheimer. In Chicago Rapid Transit Co., the trustees in bankruptcy of a railroad company sought to abandon a burdensome
branch line lease. State law, however, forbade ceasing the operations
of an existing utility." Because abandonment of the lease would have
brought operation of the line to a halt, the Seventh Circuit held that
42. For a discussion of the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code, see supra notes 34-36
and accompanying text.
43. MidatlanticNat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 755.
44. Id. at 759-60.
45. Id. at 762.
46. Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952).
47. Id. at 290.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942).
51. Id.
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the trustee could not abandon the lease. 52
The majority similarly relied on In re Lewis Jones, Inc. 53 In
Lewis, the trustees attempted to abandon underground steam pipes.54
Recognizing the importance of state safety regulations, the court held
55
that the trustees should seal the pipes before abandoning them.
The Court concluded that these cases, decided prior to Congress's codification of the abandonment power in section 554(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code, stood for the proposition that legitimate state
or federal interests limited the trustee's abandonment power.56 The
cases established a well-recognized exception to the trustee's abandonment power.5 7 Consequently, the Court concluded that in codifying
the judicially developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that a trustee could not exercise
his power of abandonment in contravention of certain state and federal laws.58
In support of its argument that the statute codified the prestatute
limitations on the trustee's abandonment power, the majority looked
first to general principles of statutory construction.59 The majority
6 ° for the
relied on Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
proposition that if Congress "intends for legislation to change the
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific."'" Noting that courts had long held to this rule in the bankruptcy context, Justice Powell reasoned that if Congress had intended
to abrogate the limitations on the trustee's abandonment power, it
62
would have done so explicitly.
Although the Court rested its decision primarily on the conclusion that the Ottenheimer exception was implicit in section 554(a), its
analysis did not end with an examination of prestatute case law.
52. Id.

53. MidatlanticNat7 Bank, 106 S.Ct. at 759 (citing In re Lewis Jones, Inc., I Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 277 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
54. In re Lewis Jones, Inc., I Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 277.
55. Id. at 280.
56. Midatlantic Nat7 Bank, 106 S.Ct. at 759.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 760.
60. 443 U.S. 256 (1979). The Edmonds Court addressed the question of whether the 1972
amendments to the Longshoremen's Act modified a judicial doctrine imposing liability on
shipowners for injuries to employees not caused by the employee's own negligence. The Court
held that the Longshoremen's Act did not modify the shipowner liability doctrine. Id. at 266
(construing Longshoremen's Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1986)).
61. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 760.
62. Id.
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Rather, the Court examined its decision in Ohio v. Kovacs 63 and other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to conclude that "Congress did
not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws that
64
otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's power.
The issue in Kovacs was whether an environmental cleanup judgment against the chief officer of a corporation that had violated environmental protection laws of the State of Ohio constituted a debt
dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).65 The Court
held that the cleanup order was a liability to pay money and therefore
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 66 In Midatlantic National Bank, however, the Court relied on the following dictum from the case:
Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of the sitewhether it is [the debtor] . . .or the bankruptcy trustee-must
comply with the environmental laws of the state of Ohio. Plainly,
that person may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the
67
state, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Kovacs supported its interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code: a trustee is not entitled to abandon
property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect the
public health and safety.68
The Court next turned to the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code. 69 This section of the Code operates to stay the
commencement or continuation of actions against entities filing a peti63. 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985).
64. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S.Ct. at 760.
65. Id. The procedural history of the case is long and complicated. Kovacs, the chief
executive officer of a company responsible for a hazardous waste disposal site, failed to comply

with an order requiring clean up of the site. The State of Ohio appointed a receiver to
implement the order. Kovacs subsequently filed a personal bankruptcy petition and the State
of Ohio responded by filing a motion in state court seeking discovery of Kovacs's income and
assets. The state also filed a complaint in bankruptcy court asking for a declaration deeming
the clean up order not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Upon Kovacs's request, however, the

bankruptcy court stayed the state court proceedings. The district court affirmed the decision of
the bankruptcy court and Ohio appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit also affirmed
the bankruptcy court's decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the

case to the Sixth Circuit to determine whether Ohio's complaint for declaratory relief rendered
the state court issues moot. In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded, 103 S.Ct. 810 (1983). On remand, the bankruptcy court held that the cleanup
order constituted a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy and both the district court and the Sixth

Circuit affirmed. Ohio v. Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983).
66. Kovacs, 105 S.Ct. at 711.
67. MidatlanticNat'l Bank, 106 S.Ct. at 760 (citing Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S.Ct. 705, 71112 (1985)). This passage, however, merely suggests that the individual occupying the property
may not violate state environmental laws; it does not cast light on whether a trustee may
abandon property during bankruptcy proceedings.
68. MidatlanticNat'! Bank, 106 S.Ct. at 760.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
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tion for bankruptcy.7 ° Congress, however, carved certain police and
regulatory power exceptions out of the operation of the automatic
stay. 7 ' The Court interpreted the automatic stay provisions to support its position that Congress did not intend to allow the trustee to
ignore nonbankruptcy law. 2
This analysis, however, faced the Court with the task of explaining why Congress carved express exceptions into the automatic stay
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, but remained silent with respect
to the abandonment power. At this point, the Court turned to the
history of the abandonment and automatic stay powers.73 The Court
explained that the exceptions to the abandonment power were wellsettled when Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 362, broadening the scope
of the automatic stay provisions. 74 Noting that "[i]n the face of the
greatly increased scope of section 362, it was necessary for Congress
70. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982). The statute provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302 or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3)
of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)),
operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of (1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of judicial, administrative, or other proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement against the debtor or against property of the estate,
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title
Id.
71. Section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code contains an exception to the automatic stay
provision: government actions are not stayed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 (1982).
72. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 760. The Court found evidence of Congress's
intent to protect the public health, at the expense of code provisions, in the government action
exception to the automatic stay section and supported its conclusion with a quote from the
legislative history of that section:
[W]here a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of
fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the
action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay.
Id. at 761 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5838; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 54 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6299) (emphasis in court's opinion).
73. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 761.
74. The court stated that:
the exceptions to the judicially created abandonment rule were well established

[when Congress enacted the automatic stay provision].... [In enacting section
362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay
...[and] in the face of the greatly increased scope of section 362 it was necessary
for Congress to limit this new power expressly.
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to limit [the automatic stay] power expressly," 7 5 the Court concluded
that the express limitations in other sections of the Code did not indicate a Congressional intent to grant unlimited abandonment power.
The Court also directed its attention to 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), the
statute governing management of the bankruptcy estate.7 6 Section
959(b) requires that the trustee manage and operate the estate property in his possession according to the requirements of state law. 7
Although the Court conceded that the statute might not be directly
applicable in the liquidation context, it cited the provision to support
its conclusion "that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code
to preempt all state laws that otherwise constrain the exercise of a
78
trustee's powers."
Finally, the Court noted that the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act 79 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act ° reflected congressional concern for
the environment and public health. Justice Powell observed that this
concern precluded the Court from presuming that the enactment of
the abandonment provision abrogated the limitations on the trustee's
abandonment power."'
The majority's opinion concluded that Congress did not intend
82
for the abandonment provision to preempt all state and local laws.
Noting that Congress did not empower the bankruptcy court to
authorize an abandonment without taking precautions to protect the
public health and safety, Justice Powell's holding stated:
Accordingly, without reaching the question of whether certain
75. Id.

76. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982).
77. The text of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) provides:
Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager
appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including a

debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession as
such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws
of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the
owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.

28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982). For a discussion of whether section 959(b) is applicable in a liquidation proceeding, see infra note 100 and accompanying text.
78. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 762. The Court's position is not without

supporters. One bankruptcy court suggested that the automatic stay provision and section
959(b) form a "smooth continuum" where the environmental protection laws temper the

bankruptcy powers. In re Kennise Diversified Corp., 34 Bankr. 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see
also In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979) (noting that Congress
intended for public interest regulations to outweigh bankruptcy laws and regulations).
79. For a discussion of the purposes of the act, see supra note 32.

80. Id.
81. MidatlanticNatl Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 762.
82. Id.
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state laws imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous
as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold that
a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state
statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards.83
The Court added a footnote noting that the abandonment power was
"not to be fettered by laws not reasonably calculated to protect the
84
public health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm."
Although this footnote suggests that abandonment will be permitted unless there is an imminent and identifiable threat to the public
health or safety,85 the Court's holding does not provide a guideline for
determining the threshold of such a threat. Accordingly, any threat
constitute a sufficient reason to deny a petito the public health might
86
abandonment.
for
tion
B.

The Dissent

Justice Rehnquist's dissent sternly criticized the majority's reliance on the Ottenheimer line of cases. 87 Justice Rehnquist distinguished Ottenheimer as merely standing for the proposition that a
judge-made rule must give way to the demands of a federal statute
when the two conflict. 8 The dissent further noted that In re Lewis
Jones, Inc. was inapposite because the court in that case found itself
free to protect the public interest only because of the judicial nature of
the abandonment rule.89 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist dismissed
the In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co. language relied on by the major-

ity as dicta.9" Finally, Justice Rehnquist stated that even assuming
arguendo that the prestatute cases were applicable, these cases "do
not constitute the sort of settled law that

. .

. Congress intended to

codify absent some expression of its intent to do so."'
Although Justice Rehnquist questioned the persuasiveness of the
prestatute cases, his dispute with the majority boiled down to a question of statutory construction. The majority found that, in enacting
section 554(a), Congress sought to codify the judge-made limits on
the trustee's abandonment power. In contrast, the crux of Justice
83. Id. at 762-63.
84. Id. at 762 n.9.
85. Id.
86. For discussion of a test that balances the interests of creditors against the threat to the
public health or safety, see infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
87. Midatlantic Nat'! Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 764 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

88. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 765 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

90. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Rehnquist's position was that the abandonment power should not be
"limited by conditions that the Congress never contemplated."9 2 He
argued that courts should not read an exception into the statute
because the language of 28 U.S.C. § 54(a) is absolute.9 3 In support of
his position, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that if Congress had intended
to limit the trustee's power, then it would have expressly done so. In
fact, section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code contains such express
limitations.9 4
Stripped to its essentials, Justice Rehnquist's approach invoked a
canon of statutory construction that commands a court to abide by
the plain meaning of a statute. 95 While there is abundant precedent
for the plain meaning rule, 96 recent decisions have cast doubt on its
viability. 97 Courts have read exceptions into the absolute language of
92. Id. at 768 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 762-63 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 764 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Justice Rehnquist's argument comes as no surprise given his literal approach to
statutory interpretation. His opinion in Garcia v. United States, in which he advocated a
"plain meaning" or "literalist" method of statutory analysis, is illustrative of his jurisprudence.
105 S. Ct. 479 (1984). Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion in Garcia, a case
involving an attempt to rob a Secret Service agent of $1800 of government money that the
agent was using to buy counterfeit currency. The sole issue in the case was whether 18 U.S.C.
§ 2114, the statute under which the petitioners were convicted, encompassed the assault of the
agent. The statute proscribed the assault and robbery of any custodian of "mail, matter or any
money or other property of the United States." Id. at 481. The petitioners argued that
Congress had only intended for the statute to apply to robbery of "postal" money.
Justice Rehnquist, however, concluded that the petitioners' conviction should be upheld,
as the statute applied to assault on anyone who came within the literal ambit of the statute. In
his view, section 2114 was plain and unambiguous. In support of this contention, Justice
Rehnquist cited language in Lewis v. United States: "[N]othing on the face of the statute
suggests a Congressional intent to limit its coverage to persons employed by the postal
service." Id. at 48 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980)). The Justice
intoned,
[w]hile we now turn to the legislative history as an additional tool of analysis, we
do so with the recognition that only the most extraordinary showing of contrary
intentions from that data would justify a limitation on the "plain meaning" of the
statutory language. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial
inquiry is complete except in "rare and exceptional circumstances."
Id.
96. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the
language itself."); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (stating that courts
should enforce statutes according to the language with which they were drafted); see also G.
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (discussing the plain
meaning approach).
97. See Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1975) ("[W]hen
aid to the construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available there
certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on
superficial examination."); see also G. CALABRESI, supra note 96, at 214. Professor Calabresi
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statutes in the past, 98 and there is no reason to believe that they will
not continue to do so in the future.
Justice Rehnquist additionally questioned the majority's reliance
on 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). 99 As Justice Rehnquist indicated, there is substantial authority for the proposition that 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) should
not apply in a liquidation proceeding." Nevertheless, numerous
cases support the majority's argument that certain limits should be
placed on the trustee's power to abandon."10
It is here that a flaw in Justice Rehnquist's dissent emerges. Each
of the majority's arguments, taken individually, might not suffice to
support a police power limitation on the trustee's abandonment
power. In the aggregate, however, the points that the majority raised
tend to support limits on the trustee's power to abandon. Although
these arguments are quite compelling, Justice Rehnquist's dissent
failed to account for them.
IV.

THE INTERESTS OF CREDITORS

In MidatlanticNationalBank, the Court established a rule of law
that limits the trustee's power to abandon "in contravention of a state
statute or regulation that is designed to protect the public health or
safety from identified hazards."' 2 In arriving at the rule, however,
the Court did not consider the interests of Quanta's creditors.
Because creditors are innocent parties who stand to suffer from the
noted that the Court, rejecting the literalist approach, now focuses on discerning legislative
purpose. Id.
98. See Boys Market v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249-53 (1970) (carving an
exception into the apparently absolute language of section 64 of the Norris-La Guardia Act).
99. MidatlanticNat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 76 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
objected:
I find the Court's discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) somewhat difficult to fathom.
After suggesting that § 959(b) "provides additional evidence" for the self-evident
proposition "that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt
all state laws," . . . the Court concedes that the provision "does not directly apply
to an abandonment under section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code . .

.

. The

precise nature of its indirect application, however, is left unclear.
Id.
100. Paige, In re Quanta Resources Corp.: Bankruptcy Policy v. EnvironmentalInterests, A
Polluted Theory, 99 AM. BANKR. L.J., 357, 368 (quoting J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & K. SINCLAIR,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 66.04 [4], at 1913 (2d ed. 1986)) ("But section 959(b) applies
only to a receiver in his operation of the property in his possession. It does not apply to the
distribution of the estate ....
").See also Missouri v. United States Bankr. Ct., 647 F.2d 768,
778 n.18 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982) (trustee in chapter 7 proceeding
did not need to obtain license that state law required); In re Adelphi Hosp. Corp., 579 F.2d
726, 729 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[A] trustee in bankruptcy is in no sense a manager of an
institution's operations ....").
101. See supra notes 46-78 and accompanying text.
102. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 762.
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high cost of toxic cleanup, a more logical approach would examine
3
both public health and safety concerns and creditor interests.'1
A simple two-pronged inquiry would leave the courts with a
more equitable rule of law to apply. The first inquiry should be
whether there is an imminent threat to the public health or safety.
Courts have interpreted imminent threat standards in the context of
injunctive relief broadly, finding the threshold met by an uncertain
risk of harm.1°4 A similar interpretation under this first prong will
afford maximum protection to the public health and safety. If there is
no imminent threat, the trustee should be permitted to abandon. If an
imminent threat is found, however, courts should make an additonal
inquiry that is sympathetic to the interests of creditors: Is there an
alternative means of enforcing or financing toxic waste cleanup?
Although the Midatlantic NationalBank Court ignored the purpose and policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code, a more sound
approach gives weight to the interests of the creditors. Justice Gibbons suggested such an approach in his dissent to the Third Circuit's
103. Such an approach would invoke the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court. See
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984) (holding that a debtor may reject a
collective bargaining agreement if a balancing of the interests of debtors, creditors and
employees calls for rejection).
104. The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
provides for injunctive relief in the face of an imminent threat to public health:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the
President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may
require the Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as may be
necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the district court of the United
States in the district in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant
such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may require. The
President may also, after notice to the affected State, take other action under this
section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to
protect public health and welfare and the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). Although the phrase "imminent and substantial endangerment"
lacks specific definition in the Act, courts have construed this standard broadly. In United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) for example, the
government alleged that the defendant disposed of carcinogenic wastes that contaminated
ground water near City of St. Louis Park. Unless preventive measures were taken, the contaminants would have continued to migrate into the ground water of the surrounding metropolitan area. The court held that "[t]he facts alleged in the complaints are sufficient to
establish an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health or environment." Id. at
1110; see also United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. I1. 1982) (dismissing defendant's motion to dismiss government's suit for injunctive relief against company
releasing PCB's into navigable waters); cf United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (standard requires a case by case assessment of
the relationship between the magnitude of risk and harm arising from the presence of hazardous waste).
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decision in Quanta.1 °5 Because creditors are not defined as culpable
parties by the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, courts that consider the interests of creditors
do not undermine the purposes underlying enviornmental protection
legislation." °6 More importantly, a test that fails to consider creditor
interests will exacerbate the hazardous waste problem as lenders will
be wary of lending money to companies generating hazardous
wastes. 10 7 As Justice O'Connor suggested in her concurring opinion
in Kovacs, other methods of enforcing the environmental protection
8
0
laws are available.1

Where do creditors' rights fit into the calculus? There are two
competing concerns-the economic interests of creditors and the
more general interest in public health and safety. One solution would
be to subordinate the rights of creditors only in situations where
105. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3rd Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J., dissenting),
aff'd sub nom. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S.Ct. 755
(1986). See also Reilly, 546 F. Supp. at 1112 (stating in accord with Justice Gibbons that
"Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poisons bear the cost and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created").
106. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6119, 6136. The legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 9607 indicates that section
3071 is designed to provide a mechanism for toxic waste cleanup. The statute is also
structured to encourage potentially liable persons to take voluntary action in response to
hazardous wastes. One court noted,
[I]t is clear from the discussions which preceded the passage of CERCLA that
the statute is designed to achieve one key objective-to facilitate the prompt
clean up of hazardous dumpsites by providing a means of financing both
governmental and private responses and by placing the ultimate financial burden
upon those responsible for the danger.
City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (emphasis added).
107. Suggesting a flaw in an approach that does not consider creditor interests, one
commentator has written:
Generally, the interests of creditors and debtors in these cases are solely
economic in nature. The major problem with subordinating the economic
interests of creditors and debtors to public health and safety interests is that
creditors would have no incentive to make loans to companies that engage in
hazardous waste disposal.
Note, supra note 6, at 1037. This would seem to magnify the hazardous waste problem as
debtors would not be able to comply with hazardous waste legislation unless they received
financing from their creditors. Although insurance against large environmental judgments
affords protection to creditors and counterbalances their disincentive to lend to industries creating toxic waste by-products, insurers have become increasingly unwilling to provide environmental liability insurance. See Angelo & Bergeson, The Expanding Scope of Liability for
EnvironmentalDamage and Its Impact on Business Transactions, 8 CORP. L. REV. 101, 116-17
(1985) (noting the diminishing number of firms willing to provide environmental liability
insurance).
108. Justice O'Connor noted that "a state may protect its interest in the enforcement of its
environmental laws by giving cleanup judgments the status of statutory liens or secured
claims." Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S.Ct. 705, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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there is no other means of efficiently enforcing a "cleanup" judgment.' 0 9 Courts should first ask whether the judgment against the
debtor can be efficiently enforced without endangering the creditors'
interests. If the judgment cannot be enforced against the debtor without endangering the interests of creditors, the government should
attempt to utilize the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act "Superfund."1 0 Only when the "Super
fund" is unavailable should the courts require innocent creditors to
pay the costs of cleanup. The virtue in this approach is that the rights
of creditors are insured without making them the insurers of the public health and safety."'
V.

CONCLUSION

The Bankruptcy Code, which Congress intended to protect both
debtors and creditors, was never meant to address a problem as complex as toxic waste. Nonetheless, in Midatlantic National Bank, the
Supreme Court addressed an issue that is sure to reoccur in bankruptcy cases-companies, faced with the staggering expense of complying with environmental legislation, file for bankruptcy and leave no
solvent, culpable party responsible for toxic waste cleanup. The
Court's decision in Midatlantic NationalBank is consistent with earlier cases that refused to subordinate public health concerns to policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code.
The Court, however, has left open an important question for
later decisions: What are the parameters of a trustee's abandonment
power when toxic wastes are involved? This note suggests that the
109. In Quanta, as in most cases of this nature, this would not have been possible because
the costs of complying with a cleanup order frequently exceed the value of the property to the
estate. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 914 (3rd Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom.
Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S.Ct. 755 (1986).
110. There are, however, restrictions on the use of the money in the fund. The federal funds
available for cleanup are inadequate. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1459, 1503 (1986). Because the amount of money in the fund is limited, the
fund can finance cleanup of only the sites on the EPA's national priority list. Second, the fund
generally may be used only if no responsible parties are able to take appropriate remedial
actions." Note, supra note 6, at 1037. Because creditors are not responsible parties within the
meaning of CERCLA, however, there would not seem to be any statutory basis for limiting the
use of the fund in the situation involving Quanta. Nevertheless, practical constraints exist.
111. One commentator proposed balancing the competing interests of creditors and public
health and safety. Note, supra note 6, at 1037. This commentator suggested a balancing of the
equities akin to the test employed in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, where the Court balanced
the policies underlying the federal labor laws and the Bankruptcy Code. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
In Bildisco, however, the Court was balancing the economic interests of debtors and creditors
against the economic interests of employees. It might be more difficult for a court to balance
the economic goals of the Bankruptcy Code with the noneconomic goals of environmental
protection legislation.
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answer to that question must consider the creditors' rights. While
the simpler equation balances only public health with the trustee's
administrative ease, a more equitable and realistic calculus incorporates creditors' interests. Furthermore, courts should not operate in a
vacuum when determining responsibility for toxic cleanup. In reality,
governmental programs designed to encourage toxic waste cleanup
exist. These programs are evidence that Congress recognizes toxic
cleanup as a national, not an individual, problem.
The Ottenheimer progeny, when examined with other provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code, suggest that certain limits should be placed
on a trustee's power to abandon property. These limitations, however, should only apply when (1) there is an imminent threat to the
public health or safety, (2) there is no efficient means of enforcing the
judgment against the debtor, and (3) no "Superfund" moneys are
available for cleanup. Otherwise, the interests of creditors dictate that
the trustee be entitled to abandon property within the provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 554(a).
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